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LEGISLATION
RELATION BETWEEN BAD FAITH AND NOTICE UNDER THE N. I. L.-A
holder in due course is defined in section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law as:
a holder who has taken the instrument under the following
conditions: . . *
(3) That he took in good faith and for value;
(4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it."
"Notice" is defined in section 56:
"To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in
the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is
negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or
knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted
to bad faith."

There is no doubt as to the meaning of the expression "good faith" in
section 52 (3). Although not defined in the N. I. L., other Uniform Acts,'
employing the same expression in a similar use, furnish a definition and explain
that "a thing is done in 'good faith' when it is in fact honestly done, whether
it be done negligently or not".' It has been held, in construing the phrase, as
applied to negotiable instruments, that it means "good faith in fact" or "actual
good faith".3 Nor is there any confusion as to the meaning of the clause,
"actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect", in section 56. This language is
clear and unequivocal. But the exact meaning of the clause, "knowledge of
such facts that his action in taking amounted to bad faith", constituting the
alternative and supplementary definition of "notice" in section 56, is doubtful
and uncertain, and its application in the cases is in irreconcilible confusion.
Notice, as therein expressed, is virtually defined in terms of "bad faith". 4
What, therefore, is the meaning of "bad faith"? Is it merely the negative of
"good faith", of section 52 (3), or does it mean something more or different?
Upon close analysis, the meaning of the language, as used in this section,
becomes elusive and has received neither a clear nor uniform interpretation by
the courts.
Since the N. I. L. is, generally speaking, a codification of the law existing
prior to its enactment, it will be instructive to consider that law. It would be
desirable, of course, to find cases which considered the subject in terms of
'UNIFORM SAI.zs AcT § 76; UNIFORM WARHousE REcsunrs Acr § 58; UNIFORM BILLS
OF LADING Acr § 53; UNIFORM STOCK TANSFER Acr § 22; UNIFORM FIDUCIARsS AcT § I.
I It is interesting to note that the Commissioner's notes to the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act says, "The definition of good faith here given is that recognized by the great weight of
authority in the law of bills and notes, ....
" 4 U. L. A. 79. The definition is the same as
that in the English Bills of Exchange Act, § go.
Howard Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 96 Vt. 438, 12o Atl. 889 (1923).
Strictly speaking, of course, notice is defined in terms of knowledge. However, the
knowledge is, in turn, determined by bad faith, and therefore, essentially, bad faith is the
test. The phrase,
"generally speaking", is used advisedly. The courts have
involved themselves in considerable difficulty by making the statement that the N. I. L. is merely a codification of the pre-existing law, and then proceeding on that basis. See Beutel, The Necessity
of a New Technique of Interpreting the N. L L.-The Civil Law Analogy (i931) 6 TuLiAI

L. REv. 1, 6.

(617)
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notice." Unfortunately, however, the courts have never been clear in their
conception of the problem,
and, as a result, have generally confused "bad
7
faith" and "notice".
I.

In the early common law, negotiable instruments were not distinguished
from other chattels as respects the law governing bona fide purchasers.8 Not
only were actual bad faith and actual knowledge of the defect or infirmity bars
to recovery, but constructive notice, based upon negligence, was also a bar.
With the development of commerce and commercial transactions it soon
became apparent that this doctrine of constructive notice was too severe to apply
to otherwise bona fide purchasers of negotiable instruments. By its rigid application, the free negotiability of paper was so hampered that the courts, at the
end of the eighteenth century, found it advisable to restrict this doctrine. Lord
Kenyon, in Lawson v. Weston,9 following the opinion of Lord Mansfield in
Miller v. Race,"0 commented upon this doctrine and stated that he did not deem
it advisable to apply the rule to its full extent, and, therefore, he vaguely suggested that actual knowledge and fraud should be the only proper tests. To
apply the doctrine to its full extent would "paralyze the circulation of all paper
in the country, and with it all its commerce." i Although this does not establish
a definite rule,'2 it does indicate a determination to depart from the rigid test
of negligence in favor of negotiability.
This view obtained in England until the case of Gill v. Cubitti' decided in
1824. In that case, Chief Justice Abbott (Lord Tenterden) upheld a charge
that the jury find for the defendant if the plaintiff had taken under circumstances which ought to have excited the suspicions of a prudent and careful
man. At the time of this decision, thefts of negotiable instruments were quite
prevalent, and Chief justice Abbott felt that the rule of Lawson v. Weston, in
effect, protected the disposal of the loot, and thereby fostered the thefts.' 4 The
rule obtained, however, only during the Chief Justice's lifetime, 15 and upon
his death it was gradually abandoned.
In 1834, in the case of Crook v. Jadis,'6 the court limited the application
of the rule to cases of gross negligence only. However, the court was not
content with this compromise, and, in 1836, Lord Denman, in the leading case
of Goodman v. Harvey,' repudiated the rule of Gill v. Cubitt in its entirety,
and said:
'In order to draw a parallel to § 56 of the N. I. L. which defines "notice".
'An excellent example of this confusion will be found in Matthews v. Poythress, 4 Ga.
287 (1848). At 306, the court goes into an extended discussion of bona fide holders, 110la
fides, notice, etc., finally concluding with the statement that "mala fides is notice". The confusion is, however, not limited to courts, since some text-writers are equally confused. See
infra notes 36-4o.

'See

DAIE,

NENOTIALE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1913) 2; BIGELow, BILLS, NOrEs AND

9.
94 Esp. 56 (Eng. 18oi).
10 Burr. 452 (Eng. 1758).
See also Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516 (Eng. 1764);
Peacock v. Rhodes, i Doug. 633 (Eng. 1781). These cases also were decided by Lord Mansfield.
' Snpra note 9, at 57.
I. e., it provides no definite test to be applied.
'34 B. & C. 466 (Eng. 1824).
I at 471, 472.
1d.
' See the comment on this in 4 CAmpBiL., LIVEs OF THE: CHIE JusTicES (i88i) 316.
5 B. & Ad. 909 (Eng. 1834). Aff'd in Backhouse v. Harrison, 5 B. & Ad. io98 (Eng.
1834).
,44 A. & E. 87o (Eng. 1836). Aff'd in Uther v. Rich, io A. & E. 784 (Eng. 1839);
Arbourn v. Anderson, I Q. B. 498 (Eng. 1841).
CHEQJES (2d ed. 19oo)
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"I believe we are all of opinion that gross negligence only would not
be a sufficient answer, where the party has given consideration for the
bill. Gross negligence may be evidence of mala fides, but is not the same
thing. We have shaken off the last remnant of the contrary doctrine.
Where the bill has passed to the plaintiff without any proof of bad faith
in him, there is no objection to his title." 18
Although to some extent obiter dictum, this statement has had a profound
effect on the subsequent law, having been abundantly quoted and apparently
followed in both England and the United States. This definite repudiation of
Gill v. Cubitt settled the law for England, 9 and removed the doctrine of constructive notice as against otherwise bona fide holders of negotiable instruments.
It should be noted that Lawson v. Weston seems to imply that good faith is the
important test, and that Gill v. Cubitt repudiated it and set up a test based upon
negligence, the result of which might have been either constructive notice or
constructive bad faith, and filially, Goodman v. Harvey, reversing Gill v. Cubitt,
speaks of bad faith, but says nothing of notice.
In the United States, Chancellor Kent wrote his Commentaries during
the lifetime of Chief Justice Abbott, and, in consequence, recorded the rule of
Gill v. Cubitt as the prevailing law of England.20 Some of the American courts
adopted that rule and followed it even after it was repudiated by Goodman v.
Harvey.21 Thus the law in the United States was in a state of confusion, some
courts following Gill z. Cubitt, and others the later rule of Goodman v. Harvey.
However, in Goodman v. Sinwnds,22 the Supreme Court of the United
States, in a detailed and well considered opinion, definitely repudiated the doctrine of Gill v. Cubitt and approved that of Goodman v. Harvey. In time,
nearly all of the American jurisdictions which had followed the rule of Gill v.
Cubitt, abandoned it and adopted the views expressed in Goodman v. Simonds.23
Therefore, prior to the enactment of the N. I. L., the law in the United States
might be considered to have been well settled to the extent that most of the
courts were applying, or intended to apply, the rule of Goodman v. Harvey,
adopted by Goodman v. Simonds, to those cases in which the holder had knowledge of facts which came close to either actual knowledge of the defect or
infirmity or actual bad faith. However, the courts were not clear in their
application of the rule, and it is difficult to determine from the decisions the
exact rule applied,
i. e., whether the decision was based upon notice or bad
24
faith or both..

"Id. at 876.
" CrALmms, BILLS OF ExcHANGE: (9th ed. 1927) 325. See also DANIEL, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 893; BIGELoW, BILLs, NOTES AND CiECKS (3d ed. 1928) 364.
213 KENT, Comm. 8I, 82.
'E. g., Marsh v. Small, 3 La. Ann. 402 (1848) ; Roth v. Colvin, Allen & Co., 32 Vt. 125

(859).

2o How. 343 (U. S. 1857). This decision was followed by that of Murray v. Lardner,
Wall. 11o (U. S. 1864) which affirmed it, and expounded further on the same subject.
Except, notably, Vermont, South Dakota, North Dakota and Georgia. The last three
even enacted the rule o~f Gill v. Cubitt in their statutes. S. D. Civ. CODE (19o3) § 2452; N.
D. REV. CODE (9o5) § 6703; GA. Civ. CODE (1895) c. 6, § 3699. These states later adopted
§ 56 of the N. 1. L. On this point in the law of the Dakotas, see Feezer and Gunderson,
Bad Faith in the Law of Negotiable Instruments (931) 3 DAK. L. J. 311.
Generally, in the law, when it is not clear under what theory a court is proceeding, a
consideration of the result attained is helpful. Unfortunately, however, in these cases the
same redult would be reached if either notice or bad faith were found. Perhaps this confusion
of the courts may explain the confusing test of notice in terms of "bad faith" in section 56
2

of the N. I. L.
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II.
The last part of section 56 provides that "knowledge of such facts that his
action in taking amounted to bad faith" constitutes notice. This means actual
knowledge and differs from the "actual knowledge" used in the first part of
section 56, only in the respect that in the latter it is actual knowledge of the
ultimate fact of infirmity or defect, while in the former it is actual knowledge
of "such facts" as strongly indicate such ultimate fact. 2' The problem still
remains: What facts must be known? The section speaks of "knowledge of
such facts that his action in taking anwunted to bad faith." Therefore, the
problem resolves itself to the ascertainment of what is meant by "bad faith",
as here used. "Bad faith" may be either actual bad faith, as opposed to actual
good faith, as used in section 52 (3), or objective bad faith, i. e., bad faith
arrived at on
the basis of an objective standard and apart from the holder's
26
actual faith.

Assuming that objective bad faith is meant, by what objective standard
could it be ascertained? Since negligence and suspicious circumstances are no
longer a bar to. recovery, the test of "bad faith" can apply only to knowledge
of facts approximating actual knowledge of the ultimate fact of infirmity or
defect. The objective test consistent with this proposition and also with the
letter of the section 27 would seem to be: Would a reasonable man, acting with
knowledge of such facts, have had bad faith?
How will this test be applied? First, it must be determined whether there
was actual good faith under section 52 (3). If there were not, then the holder
would be barred under that section. However, if there were such actual good
faith, it must next be determined whether the holder had such notice as would
bar recovery under section 52 (4)- If the holder had actual knowledge of the
defect or infirmity, he would have notice under section 56, and, therefore,
would be barred under section 52 (4). If, however, he did not have actual
knowledge, it would then be necessary to ascertain of what facts he did have
knowledge and their nature. If the facts rise above mere suspicious circumstances and his action in failing to inquire rises above negligence, it would be
submitted to the jury to determine whether a reasonable man, acting with such
knowledge, wouJd have had bad faith. If the jury finds in the affirmative, then,
under section 56, the holder's knowledge constitutes notice, and he would be
barred under section 52 (4).
However, assuming that actual bad faith is the test intended, the procedure
would be the same, except that the question submitted would be: Does the jury
believe that under such facts and circumstances the holder actually had bad
faith? This would seem to be identical with the question of actual good faith
submitted under section 52 (3), but it is presented to the jury from a different
angle. It affords a greater opportunity for a fact finding of actual bad faith,
because, under this section dealing with "notice", the admissible evidence covers
a wider field and is of a more circumstantial character.
III.
Which test was intended by the N. I. L.? Since the N. I. L. is a codification of the pre-existing law, that law, therefore, should be examined to ascertain
- If it were otherwise, why was this provision placed under the clause defining notice?
'The term "actual bad faith" is used in preference to "subjective bad faith", because the
latter necessarily is redundant. In order to avoid the use of the objectionable term "constructive bad faith" as the opposite of "actual bad faith", the term "objective bad faith" will
be used. Although this latter term involves a contradiction in terms it is preferable, and will
be used to mean bad faith arrived at on the basis of an objective standard.
I Since the section uses the phrase "amounted to bad faith", it would be desirable to
frame a test on some basis of bad faith.
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the proper interpretation of this section. However, as will be recalled from
the discussion of the historical development of the doctrine of "bad faith", the
only definite conclusion deducible is that negligence and suspicious circumstances
are not the equivalent of bad faith, but are merely evidence of it, and bad faith
thereunder must be actual bad faith.
The decisions after the enactment of the N. I. L. are of little assistance in
determining the meaning of this section. Most of the courts merely quote the
section, and decide the case on the usual vague and confused grounds prevalent
before the N. I. L.' s Other courts merely state that the N. I. L. is a codification
of the pre-existing law, but make no attempt to clarify the meaning of30 the secThere
tion.9 In other cases, no reference whatever is made to the N. I. L.
meant
is
what
of
statements
conflicting,
although
clear,
very
two
are, however,
by this section.
31
In the Nebraska case of Benton v. Sikyta, Root, J., said:
"The instruction is erroneous in permitting the jury to consider what
an ordinarily prudent man might believe from the facts brought to plaintiff's knowledge, and does not confine their deliberations to the good or
bad faith of the plaintiff, whose rights are not to be determined by reference to that fictitious individual, the 'ordinarily prudent man'. Prior to
the enactment of the present negotiable instrument statute, the law was
settled that, to constitute bad faith on the part of the purchaser of a
negotiable promissory note transferred to him for value before maturity,
he must have acquired it with knowledge of the infirmities inhering in the
original transaction or with a belief based on the circumstances known to
him that there was a defense to the instrument, or the evidence must show
that he acted in bad faith or dishonestly.

[Quotes section 56] .

.

.

The

statute, in our judgment, in no manner relaxes the rule of law decided in
the cited cases." 32
This language rejects any objective test and interprets "bad faith" as actual bad
faith. While many of the cases seem to incline to the same conclusion, they do
not say so clearly or with certainty.
Opposed to this interpretation is the view expressed3 3by the New York
courts. In Rochester & Charlotte Turnpike Co. v. Paviour, Vann, J., said:
"Even if his actual good faith is not questioned, if the facts known to
have led him to inquire, and by inquiry he would have discovered
should
him
the real situation, in a commercial sense he acted in bad faith and the law
4
will withhold from him the protection that it would otherwise extend."
This is an objective test.
saying:

Judge Hough has very aptly rephrased the idea by

Allen et al. v. Cooling et al., 161 Minn. lO, 200 N. W. 849 (1924) ; Miller v. Peoples'
Savings Bank, 193 Mo. App. 498, I86 S. W. 547 (1916).
S. E. 4O (1921). Cf.
Patterson v. Orangeburg Fertilizer Co. et al., 117 S.C. 140,8 io8
where a futile at(I9is),
W.
S.
207
531,
Ky.
182
County,
Johnson
v.
Citizens' State Bank
tempt to clarify is made.
Langston et al.,
'McKnight v. Parsons, x36 Iowa 39o, 113 N. W. 858 (1go7) ; Ferris v.
253 S. W. 309 (Tex. 1923).

io5 Kan. 361, 366, 184
"84 Neb. 8o8, 122 N. W. 61 (199o). Semble: Gigoux v. Moore,
Pac. 637, 639 (1919).
3Id. at 81i, 122 N. W. at 62.
3 164 N. Y. 281, 58 N. E. 114 (igoo). Accord: Morris v. Muir et al., MiiMisc. 739, 181
N. Y. Supp. 913 (1920).
4 Id. at 284, 58 N. E. at 115.
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".
not knowledge of the exact truth, but knowledge of some truth that
would prevent action by those commercially honest men for whom law is
made .

.

r

Of the remaining jurisdictions, many of the courts have expressed views
which lie between these two extreme tests. But the statements in these decisions
are usually vague, ambiguous or confused, and it cannot be said of them that
they establish any definite guide. It is, therefore, frequently difficult to determine to which view a particular case tends, and it is impossible to ascertain to
what extent either view is therein supported. Because of this uncertainty and
confusion these decisions are of no value toward ascertaining the meaning to
be given to this portion of section 56.
Unfortunately, the text-writers are likewise of little assistance in determining the proper interpretation to be given to the last part of section 56. They
all discuss the line of cases from Lawson v. Weston to Goodman v. Harvey,
and conclude correctly that suspicious circumstances are not bad faith, but mere
evidence of it. From that point on, the writers seem to be in the same state of
confusion as are the cases; and, since their texts are to a large extent derived
from the cases, the result is not surprising. For example, Norton confuses
bad faith and notice and comes to the conclusion that they are the same. 38
Bigelow seems to imply that actual bad faith is the proper test,37 but later
qualifies his statement to such an extent that no definite test remains.38 Crawford, the draftsman of the N. I. L., in commenting on section 56, merely has
pieced together portions of opinions, and thus is no more illuminating than the
cases. The statements seem to imply that actual bad faith is the test, but he
arrives at no definite conclusion. 9 In these and other texts, the confusion is
preserved rather than dispelled."0
Since the last part of section 56 is intended to apply to a restricted class of
cases, in which, although there is no actual knowledge of infirmity or defect,
there is knowledge of facts which strongly point to that conclusion, it may be
well to consider which of the -two views would control more effectively this
class of cases. Clearly, objective bad faith covers all such cases; but it is to be
noted that the objective test essentially inclines toward the rule of constructive
notice arising from negligence and suspicious circumstances, even though they
must be of a very high order. There is the danger, therefore, that this class
may be readily expanded to include other hard cases, such as cases of gross
negligence and the like, and there would be a tendency to a return of the rule
of Gill v. Cubitt. Furthermore, under the objective test, the jury would be
called upon to decide whether a reasonable man with knowledge of "such facts"
would have had bad faith, or, in other words, have been dishonest. Such finding
must ultimately depend on whether it would be dishonest for the holder in this
situation to take the instrument without making inquiry; and such finding would
be determinable under the test of actual bad faith.
While on first impression, actual bad faith may not seem to cover all these
cases, it will be found, on closer analysis, that the test, although restricted to a
Gerseta Corporation v. Wessex-Campbell Silk Co., 3 F. (2d) 236,

238

(C. C. A. 2d,

BILLS AND NoTEs (4th ed. 1914) §§ I25-I27a.
' "The question now being, not ought the holder to have suspected, but did he suspect the
existence of the equity? The Statute has now adopted the later rule by requiring actual
knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or a taking of the instrument in bad faith." BIGELOW,

1924'NORTON,

op. cit. supra note 19, at 364-365.
' BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 19, at 367.

1 CRAWFORD, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (3d ed. i9o8) 66, 67.
'See also DANIEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 899; Rightmire, The Doctrine of Bad Faith
in the Law of Negotiable Instruments (i92o) I8 MICH. L. REv. 355, 374.
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personal faith, amply covers the cases, intended to be included. For example, if
the holder takes with knowledge of facts which actually lead him to suspect an
infirmity or defect, and he wilfully ignores the avenues of inquiry open to him,
the jury could find, on this evidence, actual dishonesty or actual bad faith. 41
Most of the factual situations which normally would seem to be covered by
objective bad faith and not by actual bad faith, are readily reducible to this
situation, and the test of actual bad faith will, therefore, accomplish the same
result. It must also be borne in mind that a jury will necessarily use a certain
amount of objectivity in determining the actual state of mind of the holder, and
this despite the fact that it is not instructed to use an objective test. This,
however, will differ from a clear use of the objective test in that the jury will
still be kept close to the actual faith of the holder. Thus, it would seem that
whatever slack may result from the use of the test of actual bad faith will be
taken up.
It may also be well to test these opposed views by the language of sections
52 and 56. The language "amounted to" in section 56 would seem to support
the objective view. However, if the view of actual bad faith is accepted, it will
make the concept and determination of the word "faith", in sections 52 and 56,
consistent. The objection to this conclusion is that, on principles of sound
statutory construction, section 56 should be given a meaning, if permitted, different from that of section 52. This objection, however, should not be given
undue weight, since, as has been demonstrated, the question of faith, although
the same under both sections if the test of actual bad faith is accepted, is submitted to the jury from different angles.

IV.
There is, therefore, no guide by which the interpretation intended for this
section may be ascertained with certainty. Bad faith may mean either actual
bad faith or objective bad faith, and there are persuasive arguments in support
of either view. It is obvious that this confusion on so important a point should
be avoided. Therefore, it would be advisable to adopt that view which would
include, without the risk of expansion, the restricted class of cases intended to
be reached, which would be more readily understood and, with less caprice, more
uniformly applied by a jury, and which would conform better with the policy
of the act to afford a freer negotiability of paper.
The historical development of the doctrine of bad faith definitely establishes
that negligence and suspicious circumstances are not, per se, bars to rec6very,
and the N. I. L. certainly did not intend to reintroduce them. 42 Objective bad
faith, as indicated, is fraught with the danger of a return to the rule of Gill v.
Cubitt.
The test of actual bad faith furnishes the jury with a simpler and less
uncertain rule.43 It renders less likely the variable decisions of different juries
" "While he is not obliged to make inquiries, he must not wilfully shut his eyes to the
means of knowledge which he knows are at hand, as was plainly intimated by Baron Parke,
in May v. Chapman, 16 Mee. and Wels. 355, for the reason that such conduct whether equivalent to notice or not, (which Baron Parke said it was) would be plenary evidence of bad
faith." Goodman v. Simonds, supra note 22, at 367. "Bad faith in fact, or ntala fides, is the
opposite of good faith, and consists in guilty knowledge, or willful ignorance, showing a
vicious or evil mind.

.

.

!' Burnham Co. v. Sethman, 64 Colo. 189, 196, 171 Pac. 884, 887

(1918). See also Link v. Jackson, 158 Mo. App. 63, 83, 84, 139 S. W. 588, 593, 594 (I91).
See Arnd v. Aylesworth, 145 Iowa 185, 123 N. W. IO00 (1909) ; Link v. Jackson, supra

note 4i; Unaka Nat. Bank v. Butler, 113 Tenn. 574, 83 S. W. 655 (904).

"The rule of Gill v. Cubitt was abandoned principally because the question to be determined was too vague, and the courts found it almost impossible properly to instruct the jury.
How could a jury determine whether a reasonable man would have had suspicions, since one
man might be of a more suspicious nature than another? See Hamilton v. Vought, 34 N. J.
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on the issue of whether a reasonable man would have had bad faith, by obviating
the jury's visualization of a reasonable man, which would depend upon the
accident of what twelve men happen to be in the jury-box. But, above all, the
policy of the act should be controlling.
It is the policy of the N. I. L. to promote free negotiability within reasonable limits. These limitations should, however, be definite and clear, and their
interpretation should not be clouded by uncertain tests. To impose upon the
holder the test of what faith a reasonable man would have had in a particular
transaction, rather than what faith the holder actually had, is an unreasonable
interference with the negotiability of paper. Even though it has been uniformly
held that mere suspicious circumstances do not impose the duty of inquiry,
under the objective test, there would, in practical effect, be imposed upon the
holder such duty of inquiry in every case, for fear that a jury may find that
under the circumstances a reasonable man would have had bad faith. This
would seriously check and interfere with the ready negotiability of paper. On
the other hand, the test of actual bad faith is an entirely reasonable and practical
limitation, because where bad faith is found to exist, the bar is being applied to
a dishonest holder, which is as it should be. It is a reasonable and workable
policy to require the parties who put an instrument into circulation to take the
risk of that act. However, the objective test, which, in effect, compels inquiry
by the holder in every case of suspicious circumstances, shifts that risk. Therefore, the bars to recovery should be either actual knowledge or actual bad faith.
There is, therefore, no need to change the language of section 56, since by
giving the language the uniform interpretation suggested, the desired result will
be accomplished. In any event, it is important that the law be uniformly settled
and that either one or the other of these opposed interpretations be accepted and
consistently followed.
I. B. W.

L. 187 (187o) ; Phelan v. Moss, 67 Pa. 59 (1870). Would not this same reasoning apply
here with respect to the question, whether a reasonable man would have had bad .aith or
would have been dishonest? That too would vary with the nature of the individual sought
to be charged, and with the natures of the jurymen. Although it is true that a similar question is presented to juries in tort cases based upon negligence, and the court must instruct the
jury to find on the basis of what a reasonable man would or would not have done under the
circumstances, it would seem that that is much more objective and more within the ken of a

jury.

